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Service Commission ("Commission") to provide public utility water
service to Parkview. The commission decided the water company was
not required to obtain the city's franchise or consent to provide water
to Parkview because the water company was not going to use public
rights of way to provide its service. Osage had chosen not to intervene
in the Commission hearings but later filed an application for
rehearing with the Commission. That application was denied and
Osage then filed a petition for writ of review in the circuit court.
Osage served a summons and copy of the petition to the Commission,
but not to the Water Company.
The circuit court awarded judgment to Osage. Thereafter, the
Water Company filed an application to intervene in the proceeding, a
motion to set aside the judgment, a motion to dismiss the petition for
review, or in the alternative, a motion for rehearing, based on the fact
they were not given notice of the action as an interested and effected
party under Rule 100.01, Mo. Ann. Stat. § 386.510 (West 2000).
The Court of Appeals of Missouri, Western District held the
statutory provision governing judicial review of the Public Service
Commission's orders or decisions was inadequate and constitutionally
defective as to the notice requirement, and had to be supplemented by
statute requiring notice to be served on all parties. The court
therefore quashed the order of the circuit court for lack of
jurisdiction.
SarahA. Hubbard
MONTANA
Collins v. Swinger, No. 01-157, 2001 MT 265N (Mont. Dec. 17, 2001)
(affirming district court's decision that an easement by implication was
created where there was (1) separation of title; (2) a long-standing,
obvious use before the separation, which shows that the use was meant
to be permanent; and (3) necessity of the easement for the beneficial
enjoyment of the land granted or retained).
Keith and Marie Swinger ("Swingers") appealed a decision of the
district court for the Fourth Judicial District in Missoula County,
Montana, granting Gary Collins' ("Collins") request for injunctive
relief, damages, and attorney's fees. The district court had ordered
injunctive relief to allow Collins access to his water rights to Hayes
Creek on the Swingers' property, by right of easement by implication.
The Supreme Court of Montana affirmed that decision.
In the appeal, the Swingers and Collins disputed two issues. First,
the parties disagreed over who owned water rights from Hayes Creek, a
tributary of the Bitterroot River in Missoula County. The second
dispute hinged on whether the Swingers interfered with Collins' ditch
easement from Hayes Creek and his secondary easement to reach the
ditch diversion point on the Swingers' property. The Montana
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Supreme Court immediately dismissed the water rights issue, as the
matter had already been litigated in In re Adjudication of Existing Water
Rights (Swinger v. Collins).
The court then moved to the central issue in this appeal. Collins
claimed he had a ditch easement across the Swingers' property and the
Swingers wrongfully interfered with that easement. The district court
found for Collins and the Swingers appealed. In affirming the district
court's judgment, the court first considered whether an easement by
implication actually existed over the Swingers' property. It then
reviewed whether § 70-17-112, MCA included easements by
implication. The court finally looked briefly at whether the district
court erred in adopting Collins' proposed findings of fact.
Collins' water right diverted from Hayes Creek by way of a ditch
located just within the Swingers' property. Until the early 1990s,
Collins accessed his diversion point through a gate in the Swingers'
fence at the north boundary of the Swingers' land. The Swingers
removed the gate in 1993 and told Collins he could no longer access
his diversion point. Since 1996, Collins has not been able to access his
diversion point and therefore has had no control over water flow to his
property. Before any dispute over water rights, the Swingers never
It had also already been
challenged Collins' easement claim.
established that Collins water right was senior to the Swingers' right.
Therefore, the court turned to whether an easement by
implication had arisen. An easement by implication arises where there
has been: (1) separation of title; (2) a long-standing, obvious use
before the separation, which shows that the use was meant to be
permanent; and (3) necessity of the easement for the beneficial
enjoyment of the land granted or retained. The court ultimately
found Collins satisfied each element.
Collins' and the Swingers' properties had been common
ownership from the 1920s until 1948. Collins' ditch was visible and
obviously in use when the property was severed in 1948; it has been in
continuous use since 1948. Since 1948, no deed in either parties'
chain of title evidences a desire to terminate or restrict the ditch use
rights of either Collins or his predecessors. These facts satisfied the
first two elements of an implied easement. The fact that Collins could
not access water for irrigation of his land satisfied the third element in
that it deprived him of the beneficial enjoyment of his land.
Therefore, the court found an easement by implication.
The court then turned to the Swingers' claim that § 70-17-112(4),
MCA's scope was limited to easements acquired by prescription or
conveyance. The court again agreed with the district court's holding
that the statute was not an exclusive list of the easements to which the
statute applied and was not limited to easements by prescription or
conveyance. Finally, the court held that where the district court's
findings of fact were based on substantial evidence and were not
clearly erroneous, the district court did not err in adopting Collins'
proposed findings of fact. The court affirmed the judgment of the
district court, awarded costs and attorney's fees to Collins and
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remanded to the district court for further proceedings.
ChristineEllison
Gaudreau v. Clinton Irrigation Dist., 30 P.3d 1070 (Mont. 2001)
(affirming the district court's holding that: (1) the Clinton Irrigation
District ("CID") had no duty to prevent flood waters caused by icejams
on the Clark Fork River from overflowing their irrigation system and
damaging Gaudreau's property; (2) CID exercised reasonable care in
the maintenance of its system; and (3) CID had no duty to warn
Gaudreau of flooding conditions so that they could protect their
property).
Appellants, Jeanne Gaudreau ("Gaudreau") and Jerry Montelius
("Montelius") operate a horse riding and boarding facility near
Clinton, Montana near the Clark Fork River. Upstream from the
Gaudreau facility, the Clinton Irrigation District ("CID") owns and
operates an irrigation ditch. A headgate on the CID system diverts
water from the Clark Fork River into a canal. Once waters enter the
canal, they are directed through a series of culverts under an interstate
highway and into a channel that runs adjacent to the Gaudreau facility.
On the evening of February 7, 1996, an ice jam formed on the Clark
Fork River downstream from the headgate, causing river water to back
up and flood the channel upstream from the Gaudreau facility.
Another ice jam formed on the channel, which caused overland
flooding of the area adjacent to the channel, including the Gaudreau
facility. After the flooding receded, significant damage was revealed to
real and personal property at the Gaudreau facility.
Gaudreau and Montelius sued CID in the District Court, Fourth
Judicial District, Missoula County, for negligence, trespass, and
nuisance. At trial, Gaudreau and Montelius abandoned the trespass
and nuisance claims and proceeded on the negligence claims. The
district court ruled in favor of CID. Gaudreau and Montelius appealed
to the Supreme Court of Montana asserting that the district court
erred in: (1) determining that CID had no duty to prevent flood waters
caused by ice jams on the Clark Fork River from overflowing the CID
system and damaging their property; (2) determining that CID
exercised reasonable care in the maintenance of its system; and (3)
concluding that CID had no duty to warn them of the flooding
conditions so that they could protect their property.
First, the supreme court noted that Gaudreau and Montelius'
reliance on a Montana statute governing the liability of water user
associations for damages stemming from improper maintenance was
misplaced because: (1) the statute did not apply to irrigation districts,
like CID; (2) it did not impose liability, but disclaimed liability by the
state; and (3) only applied to damages "occurring on the works," and
not property damages such as those Gaudreau and Montelius alleged.
As such, the statute did not support the existence of a duty by CID to
prevent flooding due to ice jams.

